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ARGUMENT 
The Brief of Commissioner Overson contains several statements of facts and legal 
argument that need to be clarified to provide this Court with the proper perspective in this 
case that was decided in the absence of any discovery. Commissioner Overson overlooks 
the fact that there was no discovery in this case. It was decided on summary judgment 
without the benefit of a single interrogatory, deposition, admission or produced document. 
Commissioner Overson argues that Mr. Mast failed to show documents were not in the 
"exclusive control" of Commissioner Overson and therefore discovery was properly denied.. 
This assertion is not properly focused. No discovery was permitted of any kind from any 
source before this case was decided. 
The lower court's decision came too, in the face of a Rule 56(f) motion seeking 
discovery. The fact that Mr. Mast sought discovery, but was denied that opportunity, 
should give this Appellate Court pause. 
When there is a legitimate request for discovery, summary judgment should be 
postponed and discovery permitted. As the Utah Supreme Court has previously 
emphasized, "[l]itigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before 
judgment can be rendered against them, unless it is obvious from the evidence before the 
court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery." Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel Co. V. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). More 
recently, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[p]rior to the completion of discovery, 
however, it is often difficult to ascertain whether the nonmoving party will be able to sustain 
its claims. In such a case, summary judgment should generally be denied." Drysdale v. 
1 
Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). See also, Pepper v. Zion's First Natl 
Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 154 (Utah 1990) (summary judgment premature since 
nonmoving party might be able, through additional discovery, to prove different theories of 
recovery); Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 315 (Utah 1984) (summary judgment not proper 
before nonmoving party has carried "already-begun discovery proceedings to completion"); 
Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977) (summary judgment premature 
because nonmoving party's discovery not yet complete). On the points raised in the latter 
cases, it should be noted that Commissioner Overson's deposition had been noticed at the 
time of the summary judgment motion, but Commissioner Overson refused to permit his 
deposition to be taken. 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS NEED TO BE CLARIFIED 
Commissioner Overson is correct in stating that "the factual context of this case is 
rich."1 Unfortunately, much of what is recited and reviewed in his brief as factual recitations 
is irrelevant to the dispositive issues in this case. For example, the fact that when 
Commissioner Overson acts in his official capacity he may act in both an executive and 
legislative function,2 is irrelevant when the statements that are discussed are done at a 
press conference held in a public forum place and as part of a personal political campaign.3 
The reinstatement history of the Utah corporation, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah ("CTU")4 
1
 Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 18 
2
 Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 3. 
3
 Brief of Appellant David Mast at 3. 
4
 Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 4. 
2 
is immaterial when the existence of the corporate status was not challenged in the lower 
court and confirmed by affidavits filed on the record.5 Factual disagreements regarding 
basic factual matters preclude the Commissiner Overson's efforts to assert defenses in this 
case. 
B. FACTUAL DISPUTES IN THE RECORD RAISED BY CITIZEN MAST 
ARE MATERIAL TO A DEFAMATION CLAIM 
Commissioner Overson has mischaracterized the legal significance of the disputed 
factual issues that were raised in the record of Citizen Mast's opening brief. 
1. A Defamation Claim Remains on the Record 
To begin with, Commissioner Overson has overlooked the fact that the record below 
indicated an alternate basis for upholding the defamatory language claim of Citizen Mast 
was overlooked. Citizen Mast observed in his brief that 
[t]he trial court failed to acknowledge in its analysis that it also had before it 
the written statements of Commissioner Overson at the press conference 
which stated that David Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned 
Taxpayers of Utah" or "whatever [he] calls [him]self." The phrase "deceptive" 
has been recognized in Utah judicial opinions as a state of mind that would 
indicate an individiual did not have honesty, integrity, or trustworthiness... 
. This is at least an implicit statement that Citizen Mast has engaged in 
criminal conduct.6 
This further language — raised in Commissioner Overson's own documents before the trial 
court — may be viewed as either (1) defamatory in its own right or (2) sufficient when 
added to that of the trial court to make both sets of statements defamatory. Assuming that 
the previous language ruled upon by Judge Thorne or that noted above is found to be 
5
 Brief of Appellant David Mast at 12-13, footnote 34. 
6
 Brief of Appellant Mast at 5,10 (footnotes omitted.) 
3 
defamatory, the defenses raised by Commissioner Overson may not be sustained based 
on the factual record before the court.7 
2. Absolute and Privileged Defenses Are Not Applicable 
At this stage of the proceedings, the defenses raised by Commissioner Overson are 
not relevant either because (1) the defense is not relevant as a matter of law,8 or (2) 
disputed facts in the record prevents their application.9 
a. Defenses That Do Not Apply As a Matter of Law 
Under the undisputed facts of this case, several of the privileged defenses do not 
apply as a matter of law. 
(i) Defense of Consent 
Consent to the publication of defamatory material occurs when an individual 
consents to its publication. It is an absolute defense to a subsequent claim of defamation. 
Commissioner Overson relies on California precedent10 characterized as case where a 
plaintiff "impliedly consented to the subsequent publication by the defendant" as a basis 
7
 Without waiving the Rule 56(f) U.R.Civ.P. argument already made, Citizen Mast 
simply shows on reply that either as a matter of law or because of disputed factual 
claims the eight defenses raised by Commissioner Overson do not apply. Assuming 
these arguments to be correct, the Rule 56(f) U.R.Civ.P. need not be addressed. 
8
 An example of a case where the invocation of the absolute privilege associated 
with judicial proceedings was found not to apply as a matter of law is Allen v. Ortez, 802 
P.2d 1307, 1311-1313 (Utah 1990). 
9
 An example of a case where disputed facts affecting the application of a 
qualified privilege required remand after summary judgment for trial is Russell v. 
Thomson Newspapers, 842 P.2d 896, 903 (Utah 1992.) 
10
 Royerv. Steinberg, 153 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 1st Div. 1979). 
4 
for asserting this defense.11 Not only is this characterization of the relevant portions of the 
case in error,12 but the record below fails to contain any indication by Commissioner 
Overson that specific, actual consent was given by Citizen Mast to publish any defamatory 
statement regarding the relationship between himself and C.T.U. 
Furthermore, even if the publication by C.T.U. in the newspaper implied consent as 
to C.T.U. as to matters addressing the South Mountain Development, the public 
statements of C.T.U. never claimed or placed at issue the relationship of itself with Citizen 
Mast. This information was not contained in either the opening newspaper add of C.T.U., 
any earlier letters, nor the reply advertisement of Commissioner Overson. No where could 
this be implied to create consent of Citizen Mast13 to impugn him or his legal and political 
action. To be effective as to him, 
he must have consented to the particular conduct at issue or to substantially 
similar conduct. [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A 2(b) 1977]. The 
extent and content of the alleged consent must therefore be established with 
particularity. Once consent is established, it is a defense only if the consent 
has not been exceeded. 62 Am. Jr. 2d Privacy § 19 (1972).14 
11
 Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 34. 
12
 "The evidence is uncontradicted that these statements were not made public 
until Royer himself gave the letter to a local newspaper. . . . Here, Royer's own 
publication of statements charging his involvement in the distribution of bogus 
campaign literature rendered such statements absolutely privileged, and his consent 
can not be vitiated by a showing of defamatory character." Royer v. Steinberg, supra, 
153 Cal. Rptr. at 503. 
13
 Utah decisions appear to have either not ruled on the privilege of consent, 
Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), or observed that its application is to be limited narrowly. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 
556,561 n.4 (Utah 1988). 
14
 Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Commission, 304 N.W.2d 239, 251 (Iowa 
1981). 
5 
Policy arguments can not create a defense in the absence of a factual foundation.15 
(ii) Defense of Expression of Opinion 
Neither the context nor text of the Deseret News report of the press conference 
(accepted as true for Commissioner Overson) and the written comments prepared by 
Commissioner Overson (which were overlooked by Judge Thome) indicate that the 
statements were being made as expressions of opinion. Even if they did, the protections 
afforded under Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution do not apply when opinions state or 
imply facts that are false and defamatory.16 "Assertions of fact, being objectively verifiable 
and much more capable of harming reputation, are not entitled to the same protections 
afforded expressions of opinion."17 Thus, as a matter of law, the defense of an expression 
of opinion is not available. 
(Hi) Qualified privilege of Self-defense 
The qualified privilege of self-defense does not apply in this case between Citizen 
Mast and Commissioner Overson because it was C.T.U. that published the article to which 
Commissioner Overson responded. As a matter of law, self-defense can not be raised 
against a party that is not involved in the fray.18 
15
 Even if "the primary function of the consent defense is to prevent a plaintiff 
from "creating" a libelous publication by inviting or inducing indiscretion and thereby 
laying the foundation of a lawsuit for his own pecuniary gain," Brief of Appellee 
Overson at 35 (citation omitted), the Plaintiff in this case is Citizen Mast not C.T.U., the 
entity that placed the advertisement in the newspaper. Thus, the policy is not relevant. 
16
 West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994). 
17
 Id. 
18
 See Borley v. Allison, 63 NE 260 (1902) (denied the privilege when the slander 
was not in fact in reply to an accusation of the Plaintiff.) 
6 
(iv) Protection of Legitimate Interests 
Commissioner Overson correctly observes that qualified privilege has been 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court to protect legitimate interests of persons. In a case 
where higher level management discussed information regarding drug activity among its 
employees, the Court recognized that 
[t]he law has long recognized that a publication is conditionally privileged if 
made to protect a legitimate interest of the publisher. . . .A conditional 
privilege may also protect the legitimate interest of either the recipient or a 
third person... The privilege also extends to statements made to advance 
a legitimate common interest between the publisher and the recipient of the 
publication.19 
Commissioner Overson did not have a legitimate interest in making defamatory statements 
implying criminal conduct20 regarding the relationship between Citizen Mast and C.T.U. 
All laws were being complied with; it was not a matter of public interest.21 
b. Disputed Facts Limit Absolute and Conditional Privileges 
As this case was decided as a matter of summary judgment, disputed facts in the 
record regarding the existence of an absolute defense or malice sufficient to defeat a 
qualified privilege require a reversal of Judge Thome's ruling. 
(i) Absolute defense of executive or legislative privilege 
There remains a basic factual question of whether or not Commissioner Overson 
was acting in a personal or public capacity when the defamatory statements were made. 
19
 Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Utah 1991); see also Alford v. 
Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
20
 See Opening Brief of Appellant, page 10, footnote 30; page 13, footnotes 38, 
41. 
21
 See Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1 (Utah 1933). 
7 
Citizen Mast has pointed out that this factual issue was specifically commented on by 
Judge Thome during the hearing.22 Commissioner Overson has agreed that the discussion 
arose regarding the claim of executive privilege.23 There is a question of fact as to whether 
or not Commissioner Overson was performing his public duties (working as a 
Commissioner) or privately exercising constitutional rights (campaigning for office) when 
the defamatory information was communicated. As such, under the record at present, this 
absolute privilege does not apply. 
(ii). Disputed Issue of Malice Defeats Application of Privileged Defenses 
Generally, the issue of malice is ordinarily a factual issue.24 The defamatory 
allegations regarding C.T.U. and Citizen Mast was a matter of public record, of verifiable 
fact, or at a minimum placed at issue by the affidavits submitted by Citizen Mast.25 
Indeed, the record of Commissioner Overson establishes the separate nature of C.T.U. 
and Citizen Mast.26 Whether or not Commissioner Overson's defamatory declarations 
regarding Citizen Mast are judged on a negligence standard for a private person or an 
actual malice standard for a public figure,27 because of the actual knowledge of 
Commissioner Overson of the legal and separate nature of C.T.U., and the implication of 
22
 Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal at 7-8. 
23
 Brief of Appellee Overson at 19-20 
24
 Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1983). 
25
 See Affidavit of Randall Doyle H 6 (Rp. 384), Affidavit of Scott Simons H 5 (Rp. 
273.) 
26
 See A 0008 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp. 47). 
27
 Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, 842 P.2d 896, 903 (Utah 1992). 
8 
criminal conduct,28 a factual question is raised as to whether or not the statements were 
made by "an improper motive such as a desire to do harm or that the defendant did not 
honestly believe his statements to be true."29 
In addition to counter-defense of malice, other factual disputes negate the existence 
of two other qualified privileges asserted by Commissioner Overson. First, "[t]he "public 
interest" privilege is applicable, at least, when the public health and safety are involved and 
when there is a legitimate issue with respect to matters involving the expenditure of public 
funds."30 While this may be true as to the South Mountain Project, the legal relationship 
between Citizen Mast and C.T.U. was not a matter of public interest. Second, the 
defamatory language implying criminal conduct, was insufficient to make Citizen Mast a 
public figure like C.T.U.31 
(Hi) Governmental Immunity Does Not Apply 
Commissioner Overson's record is not complete enough to demonstrate that as a 
matter of law Commissioner Overson is protected by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
For reasons outlined as to why he is not entitled to absolute executive and legislative 
immunity, there is a serious question of fact as to whether or not his defamatory 
statements regarding C.T.U. and Citizen Mast were made "during the performance of the 
28
 See Opening Brief of Appellant, page 10, footnote 30; page 13, footnotes 38, 
41. 
29
 Direct Import Buyer's Association v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 
1975) affirmed as to character defamation 572 P.2d 692, 696 (Utah 1977). 
30
 Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981). 
31
 Id at 972-973. 
9 
employee's duties within the scope of employment, or under the color of authority."32 Until 
this issue is resolved, there can be no showing that the Act even applies. 
C. OTHER FACTUAL MATTERS RAISED BY OVERSON'S BRIEF: 
There are other matters raised by the brief of Commissioner Overson which distort 
the picture presented in this appeal. They are not relevant, and should not be considered. 
However, in light of the fact that Commissioner Overson's brief attempts to portray the 
background with distortions, comment upon those matters is necessary. It is the position 
of Appellant, however, that these matters need not concern the Court. 
The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah is an entity which was formed to address 
concerns of Utah taxpayers. It has been involved in such diverse issues as the "union 
only" contracting for the Salt Palace expansion. Commissioner Overson opposed this 
proposal, and solicited various groups to assist him in his opposition. Among the groups 
which filed suit to prevent the "union only" contracting, was the Association of General 
Contractors and C.T.U. Commissioner Overson met with C.T.U. in connection with that 
litigation. He requested the meeting and asked C.T.U. to join in the litigation. C.T.U. 
believed it to be an issue affecting Utah taxpayers and agreed to join the suit. During the 
suit representatives of C.T.U., including Mr. Mast met with Commissioner Overson to 
discuss the litigation. Accordingly, Commissioner Overson knew of C.T.U.'s corporate 
existence, and knew they were a separate entity from Mr. David Mast. Despite this, 
Commissioner Overson made statements to the contrary in his press conference33. 
!
 U.C.A. § 63-30-4(3)(a). 
[A Deseret News article about this is attached as Appendix Exhibit G. 
10 
There was a second matter on which Commissioner Overson contacted C.T.U. 
requesting assistance. Commissioner Overson opposed the proposed light rail system. 
C.T.U. also opposed light rail. Commissioner Overson asked for, and received, C.T.U.'s 
support in opposing the light rail system. Again, he understood the separate, corporate 
existence of C.T.U. 
As to the open meeting referred to on page 5 of the Respondent's brief, there was 
a public meeting. However, the meeting was called with less than 48 hours advance notice 
to the public. Despite this lack of advance scheduling, the public came. The public was 
unanimous in their opposition to the acquisition of the South Mountain golf course. A copy 
of the Deseret News article on the meeting is attached to this brief. (Appendix attachment 
A.) 
Although it is contended that Commissioner Overson was acting in his official 
capacity on page 32 of Respondent's brief, there is information to the contrary. The 
County agreed to provisionally pay Mr. Overson's attorney's fee bill, reserving the question 
for later determination as to whether he acted in his official capacity. A copy of the minutes 
and resolution is attached to this brief. (Appendix attachment B.) 
Respondent argues, on page 7 of its brief that there was a delay in producing 
documents by the County due to the extensive nature of the GRAMA request. That is not 
accurate. The fact is, the request was not extensive, nor did it produce much in the way 
of a response from the County. In addition, the "delay" experienced was due to the County 
redacting almost all of the information from the few materials provided. Attached to this 
brief is an example of the materials produced by the County. (Appendix attachment C.) 
11 
C.T.U. was concerned about the purchase of the South Mountain golf course 
because it was a bad deal. It was not worth the amount to be paid. (Appendix attachment 
D.) Further, C.T.U. learned that instead of the advertised price, of $8 million, the County 
was intending to bond for $13 million. (Appendix attachment E.) Accordingly, the C.T.U. 
believed this a matter of some import to taxpayers and involved themselves in the public 
dialog. It was them, and not Mr. Mast who ran the advertisement. (Appendix attachment 
F.) It was them, and not Mr. Mast who engaged in the public discourse. It was not 
appropriate for Commissioner Overson to lash out at Mr. Mast for the actions of C.T.U. 
It is also a fact that C.T.U. had sufficient reason for their concerns on this proposed 
acquisition. 
Citizen Mast filed a defamation lawsuit seeking in the alternative money damages 
or a public apology. In this appeal, he is again being faced with disparaging comments 
about his motivation, his character and his integrity. The brief of Respondent is a 
privileged communication. But it nevertheless continues the character assassination of Mr. 
Mast. 
The C.T.U. has opposed the light rail issue. It has been involved in the Olympic bid 
issue. It has been involved in litigation to save taxpayers of Utah money, when the cause 
warrants it. Mr. Mast is a concerned citizen who belongs to, but does not control the 
C.T.U. It is not his "alter ego" which he uses whenever he wants to "call himself" 
something other than by his real name. Commissioner's suggestion to that effect from the 
forum of the County Commission chambers, and in front of local media outlets who then 
reported it entitle Citizen Mast to resort to the courts for a correction. He is entitled to the 
12 
apology he seeks. Alternatively, he is entitled to have a jury decide he has been defamed 
by the unwarranted accusations of Commissioner Overson. 
Commissioner Overson asserts an entitlement to immunity for his actions which, if 
granted, President Clinton would envy. A unanimous Supreme Court recently determined 
that the President is not above the law. Neither should be Commissioner Overson. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in dismissing Citizen Mast's complaint before any discovery 
was permitted. The factual disputes which existed, even without permitting discovery, 
prevent summary judgment. There are no independent bases for sustaining the decision 
of the lower court. This Court should reverse and remand this matter for a decision on its 
merits. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 1998. 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
IJ 
O^n^erSnuffer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant David Mast 
13 
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EXHIBIT A: DESERET NEWS ARTICLE 
1-5 
Deseret News Archives Page 1 of2 
Start new search f Search help + Web Edition front page 
Archives*^ 
Deseret News Archives, 
Saturday, April 20, 1996 
GOLFERS FLAY COUNTY PLAN TO BUY LINKS 
$8 million price tag is called double what the course is worth 
By Marianne Funk, Staff Writer 
Salt Lake County announced its plans to buy the South Mountain Golf Course in 
Draper with the pride and fanfare of a hole in one. 
But angry golfers and taxpayers decry the move as nothing but a worm-burner for 
taxpayers. 
A Salt Lake County Golf Advisory Board member acknowledged that the county 
offered to buy the course partly to bail out troubled developers who realize they can't 
run it profitably themselves. "Someone's in distress," acknowledged board member 
Craig Moody at this week's public hearing over the proposed purchase of the course. 
A small, brutally candid group of county-resident golfers told the county officials 
that the $8 million purchase is such a bad idea that county bosses must be getting 
something under the table to even consider it. 
"There is something that stinks about this," said golfer Max Sherner. 
"This deal does not look right. Something is not being said here," said golfer and 
golf businessman Jimmy Blair. 
The county is planning to pay a rumored $8 million for the completed course on the 
east end of the 1,700-home South Mountain development in the foothills overlooking 
Draper. 
The county needs the course to meet growing demand for another public course in 
the southwest part of the valley, said Moody. 
The criticism: South Mountain developers are already required to build and operate 
the course as part of a deal with Draper city that allowed them to cram so many 
homes onto the west end of their property. 
Under the planned-unit development requirements with Draper, the developers must 
also make the golf course open to the public. 
So, why should the county buy the course? critics demanded. And why pay $8 
million when it costs roughly $4 million to build golf courses? 
Blair cited the cost to construct area 18-hole golf courses in the past five years: 
Wingpointe at the airport, $3.3 million in 1991; Mountain Dell in Parleys Canyon. $4 
million in 1991; West Ridge in West Valley City, $4.5 million in 1991; Riverbend in 
Riverton, $4.2 million in 1994, and Old Mill at Knudsen Corner was recently bid at 
$4.3 million. 
"We are paying for two golf courses and getting one," Blair said. 
The additional $4 million would be for the land, Moody said. County officials have 
refused to say how much they offered for the golf course, but Moody and others 
repeatedly used the $8 million figure. 
The land the course sits on is worth the additional $4 million, Moody said. "If you'll 
sell me that land today for $4 million, I'll take it," he said. 
But developers already made their money off the land when they were allowed to 
crowd almost 2,000 homes onto the rest of their property by using the golf course to 
f<* 
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meet open space requirements, said Bob Christiansen, a spokesman for Concerned 
Taxpayers for Utah. 
Let the developers run their course and keep the course on the public tax rolls 
instead of draining taxpayer resources to buy it, suggested retired economist Reed 
Smith. 
Despite the criticism, the county officials believe most of the public supports the 
purchase, said David Marshall, assistant director of the Salt Lake County Division of 
Community Support Services. "We've only heard complaints from the five or six 
people here today." 
The hearing was the only scheduled hearing on the purchase, he said. 
© 1997 Deseret News Publishing Co. 
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EXHIBIT B: MINUTES OF COUNTY COMMISSION 
Ift 
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COUNTY COMMISSIONER MINUTES 
November 20, 1996 
COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI: 
COMMISSIONER 
MARY CALLAGHAN: 
MR. DAVID 
MARSHALL: 
Chairman what do you have t o say on 5 2? I 
t h i n k we ought t o j u s t go ahead and p a s s t h a t 
as i s . 
Okay, formal motion. 
COMMISSIONER 
HORIUCHI: 
MR. MARSHALL: 
COMMISSIONER 
HORIUCHI: 
MR. MARSHALL: 
COMMISSIONER 
Why don't you just go ahead and look through 5 2. 
Commissioner, if you're going to do that, 5 2 may 
be done with reservation of rights because of the 
nature of the complaints made by Mr. Mast against 
Commissioner Overson. Some of them seem to relate 
to his official function. Some relate to that 
article that was in the newspaper which was 
identified as being paid by his political 
committee and there are some questions there, so 
if you're going to adopt that now, you might want 
to do it with a reservation of rights. 
What does that mean? 
That means that the defense would be provided but 
depending. It's kind of a cart before the horse 
question in legalities. We do not know whether 
Commission Overson when he did whatever he did and 
whether it's ever proven. We don't know if he did 
that within the scope of his employment or not. 
I guess what I'm saying here is we ought to 
probably cross it. I mean, this only is approving 
that we basically hire an attorney to defend him 
in this suit and I guess what I'm saying is if 
there's going to reservation of rights we ought to 
get to it if it becomes applicable. So I'd just 
say let's go ahead and adopt 5 2 and then at such 
time as we may have to deal with the issue of 
either culpability or whatever, we can, you know, 
handle it then. 
Okay, and it is part of the problem. I mean, you 
don't know whether or not he is acting within the 
scope of his employment until the judge a year 
from now says he is or isn't. In the meantime, 
you have the cost of incurred . . . 
EXHIBIT 
% 
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HORIUCHI: But here again, what I'm saying is if in the end 
it ends up finding that there may be reservation 
of rights it might apply then* It would take a 
second vote later on and I guess what I'm saying 
to you is we'll just go ahead and approve 5 2 as 
is and if we come to that bridge . . . 
MR. MARSHALL: I just wanted to make the commission aware 
COMMISSIONER 
HORIUCHI: 
MR. MARSHALL: 
COMMISSIONER 
BRENT OVERSON: 
MR. ROBERT S, 
HOWELL: 
COMMISSIONER 
HORIUCHI: 
COMMISSIONER 
CALLAGHAN: 
Specifically then by your motion the Commission is 
approving outside counsel hiring. I chink you 
might want to make that. 
I don't want to belabor this too much, but that's 
the request that's 5.2 in its wording says to the 
County Attorney to defend him and it doesn't ask 
for outside counsel. So we got to face up to that 
also-
Let me just take a look at it real quick. There's 
a space that says Salt Lake County defend me, I 
don't get the point whether it's the County 
Attorney* 
Either do I. I'm not sure exactly whac 
Commissioner Overson was thinking what he wanted. 
And I think if the issue probably was an outside 
counsel, but should we add that in Mr. Marshall? 
(inaudible) Okay, let's add that- The intent is 
to hire outside counsel. 
11 is payment of bills, 12 Salt Lake County 
personnel CP4 actions. 
S: \USGENEFA\OVTRSONWrNUTES.N20 
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Mr- Howell stated that it means the defense would be provided, but 
it ia kind of a cart before the horse question in legalities. They do not know 
whether Commission Overs on, whan ha did whatever ha did and is ever proven, did 
that within tha scope of his employment or not. 
Canmissionar Horiuchi stated that this is only approving that they 
hire an attorney to defend him in this suit and if there is going to be a 
reservation of rights, they ought to get to it if it becomes applicable. He says 
that thay should go ahead and adopt this and then at such time as they may have 
to deal with an issue of either culpability or whatever, they can handle it then. 
Mr. Howell stated that this is part of the problem - they don't know 
whether or not he is acting within the scope of his employment until the judge, 
a year from now, says he is or he isn't. In the meantime they have the coats 
that are incurred. 
Commissioner Horiuchi stated that if in the end it ends up finding 
that there might be a reservation of rights, it would take a separate vote later 
on and what he is saying is for them to go ahead and approve this as is and if 
thay coma to that bridge... 
Mr. David Marshall, Community 6 Support Services Associate Director/ 
stated that specifically, by their motion, the Commission is approving outside 
counsel being hired. 
Mr. Howell stated that the request end it's wording says for the 
County Attorney to defend him, it doesn't ask for outside counsel. 
Comal a a loner Horiuchi looked at the letter and stated that basically 
it says for "Salt Lake County to defend roeM and he doesn't get the point, whether 
it is tha County Attorney or..., 
Mr. Howell stated that ha wasn't sure what Commissioner Overson was 
thinking at that time. 
Casnaisalonar Horiuchi indicated that the issue probably was outside 
counsel. He asked Mr. Marshall if they should add that in (yea) the intent is 
to hire outside counsel. 
Roll was called approving the request, authorizing Commissioner 
Overson to affect same, showed that both Commiaeloners voted "Aye." 
••• ••• ••• • •• ••• 
Mr. Paul J. Lund, Chief Deputy Assessor/ submitted a letter 
requesting parmission to allow monetary compensation to Kevin Jacobs. Division 
Director of Administration a Fiscal Management, who was recently reassigned to 
Divieion Director of Motor Vehicles, for 85 hours of compensatory time. Mr. 
Jacobs has accumulated 85 hours of unforseen compensatory time due to the change 
of hla position and extraordinary performance under unusual circumstances. At 
this very critical time, the Assessor's Office is not in a position to allow Mr. 
Jacobs to take the compensatory time. It would be awarded at straight time. 
Roll was called denying the request, notifying Mr. t«und of same, 
showed that both Commissioners voted "Aye." 
••* ••• • •• ••• ••• 
Mr. Romney M. Stewart, Solid Waste Management Director, submitted the 
reaommandatione made by the Bait Lake Valley Solid Waste Management Council at 
its September 20, 1996, meeting. 
Roll was called approving the recommendations, authorizing Mr. 
Stewart to affaot same, showed that both Commissioners voted "Aye." 
7-1 
Mr. Rogar B, Hillam, Raal Eatata Saotion Managar, aubmittad a lattar 
raquaating a partial faa take for proparty ownad by William Q. a Julia H, 
Eckitrora, 13836 South 2200 Waat/2:C -- Roaa Creek Corridor Project. Fair market 
value has bean sat. 
Roll was called approving tha requeet, authorizing Mr. Hi11am to 
af foot mmme, ahowad that both Commissioner a voted "Aye." 
••• ••• ••• • •• • •• 
Mr. Rogar B. Hillam, Real Estate Section Manager, submitted the 
following Rasolution t2400 and a Permanent Construction Basement and a Temporary 
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GENE 
BATES 
G O L F D E S I G N 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN GOLF COURSE 
Draper, Utah 
The cost estimate prepared by Gene Bates Golf Design for the South Mountain Golf Course property is 
based on averages of bids submitted for the other work in Salt Lake County. Where items on the South 
Mountam cost estimate do not correlate to any line item in the die other projects we reviewed, a judgment was 
made based upon experience to determine if the estimate was accurate. 
Some quantities were not available in any of the materials we received In ihcsc cases we either did 
take-off firom the plans or estimated the quantities based upon our study of the plans. Every effort was made 
to accurately estimate the construction cost for the South Mountain Golf Course based on the information we 
received. 
SCHEDULE OF BID ITEMS 
Item Description Unit Est Qty. Unit Price Total 
1. Mobilization 
2. Survey and Staking 
L.S. 
L.S. 
*It is assumed that his price is sufficient. 
Please confirm with county surveyor to determine 
an accurate estimate for this item. 
a. Erosion Control 
b. Clearing and Grubbing 
L.S. 
^Quantities of erosion control materials are 
not provided and it is assumed that this 
price is sufficient. 
AC. 
5606 PGA Blvd., Suite 111 
Palm Beach Gardens. Florida 33418 
Telephone: (407) 624-0808 Fax: [407] 624-4227 
7-S> 
Item Description Unit Est Qty. Unit Price Total 
*The unit price given in the original South Mountain 
cost estimate appears to be low. The original bid was 
used with an inflation factory of 10% to adjust to 1996 
prices. This amount is only an estimate and should be 
verified with a local contractor. 
*No line item from other bids we reviewed bid correlates 
with this line item. It is assumed that this bid 
amount is sufficient 
8. Fairway Drainage L.F. 
a- 6" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe 
b. 8? Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe 
c. 10" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe 
d. 12" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe 
e. '15" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe 
£ 12" Cast Iron Inlet Grate 
g. 18" Cast Iron Inlet Grate 
L 24" Cast Iron Inlet Grate 
•These quantities are actual take-offs by Gene Bates 
Golf Design based upon our recommendation of increased 
fairway drainage pipe size. 
9. Culverts 
^ 
Item Description Unit Est Qty. Unit Price Total 
b. 30" Pipe 
c. 36" Pipe 
& Headwall/Rip Rap Ea. 
10. Water Features 
11. Wood Pole Walls 
12. Bridges 
*A11 sizing of 24"-36!t must be done by an engineer. 
Culvert pipe size has been estimated for cost 
estimating purposes. 
L.S. 
L.F. 
L.F. 
*The South Mountain plans do not show any bridges. 
From our review, however, it appears that some bridges 
are necessary based upon the severity of the topography. 
The original quantity in the South Mountain bid appears 
to be sufficient to construct the bridges necessary for 
this project vHHHHH^HHmHIHilHIHH 
The estimated unit price given in this cost estimate is our 
estimate for a wood bridge on this site. 
13. Rock Walls/Retaining Walls/Rip Rap 
a. 4' High Rock Wall 
b. 6' High Rock Wall 
c. Rip rap 
14. Irrigation System 
L.F. 
L.F. 
S.F. 
*Rock walls were not quantified in the plans. The bid 
quantities provided seemed low so we quantified the lengths 
of the rock walls on the plans and assumed that approximately 
half would be 6 feet high. 
L.S. 
•System designed by'Dale Winchester and pricing appears 
accurate. 
-ri 
Item Description Unit Est. Qty. Unit Price Total 
15. Lake Sealing (30 mil PVC) Sq.Ft. 
16. Lake Shoreline L.F. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Lake Overflow and Transfer 
System 
L.S. 
Topsoiling Cu.Yd. 
Greens (USGA w/o choker layer) Sq.Ft 
•Greens square footage is based upon Gene Bates 
Golf Design's recommendation of reducing green 
size by 800 sq. ft. per green. The smaller greens 
will average 6,237 square feet each; the addition of 
the practice greens at 15,400 square feet gives the 
totaL 
20. Bunkers (inc. drainage) 
21. Tees 
22. Cart Path (8' Wide Concrete) 
a. 6" High Concrete Curb 
23. Seedbed Preparation 
24. Fumigation 
S.F. 
Sq.Ft 
L.F. 
LJF. 
•Curbing was not quantified in the South Mountain plansl 
The estimate was derived by quantifying the amount of 
curbing shown on the plans. 
AC. 
*This quantity includes tee surrounds, green surrounds, 
fairways, roughs, intermediate and far roughts. This 
quantity may be high, but we have no way of knowing the 
correct quantity of area to be prepared for seeding 
without knowing more about the site. 
S.F. 
i^ 
Item Description Unit Est Qty. Unit Price Total 
25. Pre-emergence 
26. Sod 
AC. 
Sq.Yd 
0.00 
27. Fairways 
a. Seeding 
b. Sprigging 
28. Greens 
a. Seeding 
b. Sprigging 
29. Tees 
a. seeding 
b. sprigging 
30. Transition Areas 
TOTAL: 
AC 
S-F. 
S.F. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
a. Intcnnediate Rough. 
b. Native Glass Seed 
Fertilization 
Soil Amendments 
Landscaping and Re-establish 
Native Trees 
AC. 
AC. 
L.S. 
L.S. 
L.S. 
1A 
EXHIBIT D: COST ANALYSIS FOR GOLF COURSE 
"bO 
Buying Draper Golf Course a Bad Deal, Says Golf Professional 
Byline: By Jon Ure THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
04/17/96 
A 20-year golf professional who builds and operates courses claims Salt Lake 
County will rip off taxpayers if it acquires an 18-hole, $8 million golf course on 
Draper's South Mountain. 
Jim Blair, co-owner of Mulligan's Golf and Games in Ogden and Riverton, said he 
will oppose the deal at a public hearing on the proposal today at noon in the Meadow 
Brook Golf Course clubhouse, 4197 S. 1300 West. 
He has joined with Dave Mast, chairman of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, in 
opposing the purchase. Both say South Mountain's $8 million price tag is ridiculous, 
and by their reckoning, the county should pay no more than $4 million. 
Mast's group has filed a lawsuit to prevent the transaction. He said South Mountain's 
developers and the Salt Lake County Commission are engaged in a sweetheart deal 
and complained that his freedom of information requests for county and South 
Mountain documents regarding the proposed purchase are being illegally thwarted. 
The $8 million figure does not include a clubhouse on the course in the middle of 
South Mountain's 1,700 residences. Blair and Mast said other golf courses in the 
area, including those superior to South Mountain's, cost half that much. 
And if South Mountain is donating the land, why will it cost the county the whole $8 
million? asked Blair. Blair also wanted to know why the county should own and 
operate it. 
"I'm a concerned taxpayer and they're making a killing on this deal. People 
shouldn't be retiring on this. In makes no sense. That golf course is worth between 
$3 million and $4 million." 
"Its not like the commissioners wet out and cut a deal," Overson said. South 
Mountain's plan was picked from a list of three by the county's Golf Advisory 
Board. And since the county approached South Mountain, competitive bids were 
never even a notion, added South Mountain developer Terry Deihl. 
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RICHARDSON APPRAISAL 
506 South Main, Suite 100 Bountiful, Utah 84010 (801) 299-1966 Fax (801) 298-3438 
FAX: October 18,1996 - 5 pages 
Attn.: David Mast FAX# 523-2283 
RE: Golf course information as requested per conversation on October 15,1996. 
Dear Dave: 
The following sale comparables are provided to assist in your discussions with the county 
concerning the South Mountain golf course sale. This is the same information I provided to 
Mamie Funk of the Deseret News several weeks ago. The following points are 
emphasized: 
1. Specific sales data should not be published or publicly discussed unless you obtain 
direct permission from either the seller or buyer of the transaction, This is more a matter of 
courtesy than anything else. THK Associates, Inc. is the source for some of this data. They 
should be able to provide phone numbers for either the buyer or the seller. Their phone 
number is (303) 770-7201. It may be quicker, however, just to contact the local operators. 
Sale Nos. 6, 7, and 8 involve either West Bountiful or St. George cities. 
2. The point of providing these sales is to emphasize the difference between market value 
and value-in-use (often defined as cost) as we discussed. The higher end country club 
sales are included to show how out-of-line the $7.9 million offer was as it concerned a 
property with fewer amenities than the superior country club buildings, pools, etc. My 
understanding is South Mountain is to be a public daily fee course. The comparables which 
should be focused on are therefore Sale Nos. 5, 6, and 9 and, to a lesser extent, Sale Nos. 
7 and 8. 
Without getting too technical, I would hope it is apparent in a general sense that the 
indicated sale prices for these public courses of $2,050,000 to $4,180,000 do not remotely 
support the $7,900,000 number the county was offering, claim of support to the contrary. 
You may remember my discussion with Roger Hillam on August 29, 1996 in which he 
-bV 
APPRAISAL OFFICE 881 298 3438 P. 02 
admitted he understood the difference between market value and value-in-use, and that the 
county had not obtained market value but a "developmental value" (i.e. cost or value-in-
use). He inferred that there were no sale comparables in the report, but then added that 
even if there were they would not be available for viewing to the public (one of my main 
motivations for calling him was to discover actual sales data for comparable purposes in my 
own work). The strong inference in the county's ad that independent market value 
appraisals have been obtained therefore appears to be grossly inaccurate. Also, Mr. Hillam 
said only one appraisal, not multiple appraisals, were obtained. The county's full page 
declaration of "facts" {Deseret News, Aug. 26, 1996, p. A7) stated the later. Poor 
communication is the problem here at best. I won't opine what the worst scenario(s) are.... 
3. You will notice that the sales dates are "older" if you are used to the residential appraisal 
tradition of seeing sale comparables within a six month period only. As you can appreciate, 
this type of property does not sale often in the open market, and these are the latest sales 
of which I am aware in this market. The important point to focus on is not the sale date but 
the quality of the income which was purchased. Sale No. 9 is the best example, as it is the 
highest price sale of the public courses (I'm picking the "best" for argument's sake), one of 
the newest sales, and is one of the nicer local courses. Similar superlatives are being 
applied for South Mountain, so such is assumed for argument's sake. Park Meadows 
indicated green fees of $35 and annual rounds of 23,000 at time of sale. Had the county 
continued with their proposed green fees of $20-$24, you can readily see that the number of 
rounds would need to be extremely high in order to induce the same type of buyer to 
purchase South Mountain. Even in a random and imperfect market such as this, the 
numbers and green fees being quoted show no consistency at all with what has actually 
taken place in the past. 
4. It is also unclear why or how a different prospective owner than the county is reportedly 
projecting up to triple the green fees compared to the county's projection simply by a 
change of ownership, as reported in the Deseret News. The private sector buyer is 
projecting fees in the $50 to $60 range while the county claims fees will be near $20 to $24 
if the county operates the course. Doesn't the market have something to say about that, or 
would the new owner also change the physical aspect of the course from what the county 
33 
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was going to purchase; i.e., by adding a clubhouse and/or additional amenities after the 
purchase? If so, then the comparison then becomes like apples to oranges. 
The county can't ethically have it both ways: either they are competent in maximizing 
potential income and the other potential buyer (from the private sector, no less) isn't as 
"competent" and has unrealistically projected unattainable fees OR the county must be put 
in a position of subsidizing the operation of the course ( a luxury no private sector buyer 
would have) since green fees would be economically insufficient to justify the purchase 
price paid. The county denies that taxpayers would need to subsidize operation per the 
newspaper articles I've read. 
Having said the above, I wish it to be known I have no agenda other than that people tell the 
truth. I am not a golfer, nor do I live in the Draper area. I personally don't care if a golf 
course is built or purchased or not. I do care if governmental agencies who have 
stewardship to manage public funds are competent and / or truthful in doing so. I have no 
financial or any other type of interest in any of these proceedings. I have not met any of the 
parties involved in person. I am only responding to what I read and hear in the media, and 
felt an ethical responsibility to pass on what I know concerning this matter. Thanks for your 
interest in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
(LI 
V. Clark Richardson 
1>H 
Sale No. 
Name. 
Location: 
Sales Oate: 
Sales Price-
Sale Terms: 
Seller 
Buyer: 
Type of Course: 
No. of Holes: 
Par 
Slope Rating: 
Course Acres: 
Total Acres: 
No. of 18-Hote Rounds Played. 
18-Hole Green Fees (weekend): 
18-Hole Cart Fees: 
Initiation Fees: 
Annual Dues: 
Clubhouse Size (sq.ft.): 
Maintenance Bldg Size (sq.ft.): 
Age at Sale (years): 
Food & Beverage: 
Other Amenities: 
Comments: 
1 
Plum Creek 
193 Apricot Way 
Castle Rock. Colorado 
Mar-86 
$3,500,000 
cash 
JPM. Inc. 
Plum Creek Partners 
Private Club 
18 
72 
129 
125.0 
144.9 
24,000 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
$1,500 
39.444 
3.500 
4 
yes 
2 tennis courts 
2 
Lone Iree Country Club 
9808 Sunningdale Blvd 
Littleton. Colorado 
Sep-91 
$4,600,000 
cash 
Manlyn C Green, public trustee 
So. SurtHXtoao Parfcs A Htacr+mtkm 
Private Club (d) 
18 
72 
127 
160.0 
189 1 
25.000 
$30 00 (a) 
$20.00 (a) 
n/a 
$1,600 
45.158 
5.195 
6 
yes 
4 tennis courts, pool 
15 guest suites in club-
house; sold for $3,500,000 
in 1985 without the clbhse. 
bALtb 
3 
Meridian Golf Club 
972 So Meridian 
Englewood, Colorado 
Nov-91 
$4,675,000 
cash 
Meridian Assoaates West 
Central Sport Co. LTD 
Private Club 
18 
72 
134 
237.3 
240.0 
20.000 
n/a 
n/a 
$1,000 
$1,800 
1.800 
3.500 
6 
no 
3 practice holes 
Bar & grill added after 
sale, annual corporate 
fees became $2,100. 
$255,556 
$28,750 
$184 
n/a 
$259,722 
$19,701 
$234 
n/a 
Units of Comparison 
Price/Hole: $194,444 
Price/Course Acre: $28,000 
Price/18-Hole Rounds Played: $ 146 
Greens Fee Multiplier (j): n/a 
Footnotes 
a) Unclear whether these were fees at time of sale or not. nonresident green lees at $40 
b) Excludes initiation fees of S30.000 corporate. $5,000 nonresident, and $2,000 social, and annual nonresident and soaal fees of $1,380. 
c) Effective dale of appraisal 
d) Converted lo public dub after the sate 
e) Sate included an exchange clause whch allows seller to exchange a course they plan to construct in the vicmdy for the Sunbrook course 
The sellers plan to then convert this course lo a private dub 
0 Excludes $500 soaal membership and $7 500 p membership 
<j) I *rJudes $l?0fyi irrigation assessment annual soaal dues are X510 
It) Includes 8.507 sq fl lowor level lui carl sloraqc 
0 I lutihoti'.f .Hid ni.iuili'ii.iiii.r tHi'Miiig*, will l»o IH*V» 
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Glenmoor Country Club 
110 Glenmoor Or. 
Cherry Hills Village. CO. 
Jut-94 
$5,200,000 
cash 
Glenmoor Title Holding Co. 
Glenmoor Country Club 
Private Club 
18 
71 
134 
116.36 
119.23 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
$17,500 (b) 
$3,180 (b) 
43.855 
8.236 
10 
yes 
4 tennis courts, pool 
Arrowhead 
10850 Sundown Trail 
Littleton. Colorado 
Mar-88 
$3,530,000 
cash 
Arrowhead Golf Corporation 
American Golf Corporation 
Daily Fee 
18 
70 
134 
160.0 
180 0 
35,000 
$57.00 
w/ green fee 
3.500 
smart 
14 
yes 
none 
$288,889 
$44,689 
n/a 
n/a 
$196,111 
$22,063 
$101 
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Safp No 
Name 
Location 
Sales Date 
Sales Pnce 
Sale Terms 
Seller 
Buyer 
Type of Course 
No of Holes 
Par 
Slope Rating 
Course Acres 
Total Acres 
No of 18-Hole Rounds Played 
18 Hole Green Fees (weekend) 
18-Hole Cart Fees 
nitiadon Fees 
Vnnual Dues 
Clubhouse Sue (sq ft) 
4amtenance B/dg Size (sq ft ) 
.ge at Sale (years) 
ood 6. Beverage 
•ther Amenities 
omments 
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•rice/Hole 
'nee/Course A a e 
nce/18 Hole Rounds Played 
•reens Fee Multiplier (j) 
Spring Meadows 
1201 No 1100W 
West Ootintiful, Utah 
Apr-88 
$835,000 
cash 
Greg 8. Stuart Smith 
West Bountiful City 
Daily Fee 
9 
36 
n/a 
6 4 0 
n/a 
14 000 
$1000 
n/a 
1 250 
small 
31 
yes 
none 
Rounds increased to 
36.000 after 1 year, city 
later -added 9 holes 
$92,778 
$13 047 
$60 
60 
GOLF COU 
7 
Sunbn>ok 
2240 W SunbfOokOf 
St George, Utah 
Aug 90 
$3,408,000 
cash (e) 
Sunbrook Lid 
City of St George 
Municipal 
18 
72 
129 
148 0 
n/a 
55.000 
$35 50 
w/ green fees 
1.200 
shed 
new 
snack bar 
none 
Sale did not include the 
mamt bldg as the city 
constructed it 
$189 333 
$23,027 
$62 
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Southgnte 
1975 So Tonaquint Or 
St George. Utah 
Sep-91 
$2,050,000 
cash 
Herbert B Stratlon 
City of St George 
Municipal 
18 
70 
119 
127 31 
n/a 
70 000 
$17 50 
$9 50 
4 320 
shed 
20 
yes 
none 
Seller purchased in 7/88 at 
$2,062,554. had financial 
difficulty at time of sale 
$113,889 
$16,102 
$29 
1 7 
9 
Park Meadows 
200 Meadows Dr. 
Park City. Utah 
Sep-91 
$4,180,000 
cash 
Valley Bank & Trust 
Marsaru Yokouchi 
Daily Fee 
18 
72 
n/a 
1700 
195 0 
23 000 
$35 00 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
8 
yes 
none 
Operated as pnvate club 
until bank took over in 
1988 
$232,222 
$24,588 
$182 
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EXHIBIT E: COUNTY FUNDING FOR $13 MILLION 
•hi 
RESOLUTION NO. £££3 
DECLARATION OF OFFICIAL INTENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
TO REIMBURSE ITSELF FROM BOND PROCEEDS FOR CERTAIN 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE ACQUISITION AND 
COMPLETION OF THE SOUTH MOUNTAIN GOLF COURSE AND 
RELATED FACILITIES; ESTABLISHING THE MAXIMUM 
PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF SUCH EXPENDITURES AND 
AUTHORIZING INCIDENTAL ACTION 
WHEREAS, Salt Lake County (the "County") expects to incur significant costs 
for the acquisition and completion of the South Mountain Golf Course and Related 
Facilities to be located at the Southern end of the County (the "Project"); and 
WHEREAS, the County has determined that it intends to finance all or a portion 
of the cost of the Project with the proceeds of obligations of the County or its Municipal 
Building Authority (the "Authority"), the interest on which is excludable from gross 
income for federal income tax purposes ("tax-exempt bonds"); and 
WHEREAS, no costs of the Project to be reimbursed were paid more than 60 
days prior to the date of this Resolution, other than preliminary expenditures (not 
exceeding 20% of the aggregate issue price of the tax-exempt bonds issued to finance the 
Project), provided that such preliminary expenditures shall not include costs of land 
acquisition or site preparation or other costs of construction or acquisition of the Project; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS FOLLOWS: 
Section 1. Declaration of Official Intent to Finance Capital Expenditures: 
Maximum Authorized Debt. The County hereby declares its intention and reasonable 
expectation to use proceeds of tax-exempt bonds (the "Reimbursement Bonds") of the 
County or the Authority to reimburse itself for expenditures for costs of the Project. The 
County intends that the Reimbursement Bonds are to be issued, and the reimbursements 
made, by the later of 18-months after the payment of the costs or after the Project is 
placed in service, but in any event, no later than three years after the date the original 
expenditure was paid. The County anticipates that the maximum principal amount of the 
Bonds which will be issued to finance the Project (including the Reimbursement Bonds) 
will not exceed $13,000,000. 
Section 2. Nature of Project Costs. The costs of the Project consists entirely 
of capital expenditures or costs of issuance of tax-exempt bonds, and no cost of the 
Project to be reimbursed with the proceeds of the Reimbursement Bonds is a cost of 
working capital. 
Section 3. Incidental Action. The appropriate officers of the County are 
hereby authorized and directed to take or approve the taking of such actions as may be 
264230.00KPF) 2 
necessary or appropriate in order to preserve the ability of the County to finance its 
capital expenditures in accordance with the federal tax regulations and this Resolution. 
Section 4. No Replacement Proceeds. The County will not, at any time within 
one year after any allocation of proceeds of the Reimbursement Bonds to reimburse any 
expenditure, use the reimbursed funds to create a sinking fund for any issue of tax-
exempt bonds, or to otherwise replace the proceeds of any issue of tax-exempt bonds. 
Section 5. Effective Date: Repeal. This Resolution shall take effect 
immediately. All prior resolutions or portions thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby 
repealed. 
ADOPTED AND APPROVED this 7th day of August, 1996. 
__ Chairman 
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EXHIBIT F: LETTER TO EDITOR, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
MO 
COMMISSIONER OVERSON HASNT ADDRESSED CHARGES ABOUT GOLF COU.. Page 1 ot 2 
ehf^aHi'aJifgribnnr 
Wednesday. September IK 1996 
COMMISSIONER OVERSON HASN'T ADDRESSED 
CHARGES ABOUT GOLF COURSE 
I am a member of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah (CTU) and feel it is m\ duty as a 
citizen of Salt Lake County to comment on the recent full-page ad placed in The Salt Lake Tribune 
(Aug. 22) and Deseret News by our group. I, among others of our group, reviewed the ad prior to its 
publication and agreed to its contents entirely. 
In response to our ad. County' Commissioner Brent Overson contacted the press and local tele\ision 
stations and held a press conference (Tribune, Aug. 23). At Overson's press conference he chose not 
to address our group's concerns. Conversely, he attacked David Mast, chairman of Concerned 
Taxpayers of Utah, personally. 
It has proven quite difficult for a small non-profit organization to receive equal press coverage and 
opportunity as reserved for public officials, namely Brent Overson. In addition, since the issues 
raised by CTU were placed on the "back burner" in relation to Overson's personal attacks at the press 
conference, he now enjoys the luxury of relying on his team of county attorneys to get him out of this 
dilemma, at taxpayers' expense. I found it quite amazing that not one media or news representative 
had questions about the allegations against Overson. 
Personally, I left California after 16 years for the , ' kinder, more gentle" life in Utah. Illegal 
immigration and generation after generation living on government programs continue to erode 
California's fiscal strength. Utah's Legislature chose to squander most of our state's tax surplus last 
year (especially considering the money wasn't theirs to spend), and ill-spent funds such as Overson's 
South Mountain golf course proposal can send our swiftly growing economy into the same kind of 
economic quandary. 
The golf course in question is expected to be completed in 1998, and South Mountain developers 
are contractually required to build it at their expense and dedicate it to Draper City as a public golf 
course. Why, then, would the county even consider purchasing this course for $7 9 million or for any 
price? 
Dave Mast is one of the most scrupulous and empathetic men that I have had the fortune to meet. 
His purpose and the purpose of CTU is the protection of our fellow taxpayers from waste and 
corruption. Our group's questions to Salt Lake County and Brent Overson still remain unanswered, 
and our request for incomplete and denied documents continues. 
VINCENT VENTURA 
Salt Lake City 
Hi 
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Tuesday, March 29, 1994 
S.L. COUNTY DEFENDS FIXING OF WAGES ON PALACE 
PACTS 
Judge troubled by talk of using project's jobs and pay as rewards for 
favors. 
Deseret News staff writer Joe Costanzo contributed to this article. 
By Marianne Funk, Staff Writer 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County told a state judge Monday that county officials can 
legally require contractors working on the Salt Palace renovation to pay a 
predetermined wage to subcontractors and employees. 
But 3rd District Judge Richard Moffat was skeptical. Salt Lake County 
Commissioner James Bradley's remarks about rewarding union workers for past 
lobbying efforts by giving them plenty of work on the Salt Palace troubled the judge. 
"It raises the question whether doing favors for unions or anyone else is any of the 
county's business at all," Moffat said during a two-hour hearing on the matter. 
Favoring union workers is not a valid motive for requiring predetermined wages -
identical to union wages - on the project. 
In a sworn affidavit submitted to the court, Bradley admitted telling independent 
contractors that the county wanted union workers to have a "presence" on the project 
because the unions lobbied hard for the passage of the restaurant tax bill at the 
Legislature. 
But Bradley said such thanks was only one of several reasons for the predetermined 
wage, said William Hyde, chief deputy of the civil division of the Salt Lake County 
attorney's office. "It was one of many reasons discussed," he told Moffat. 
Salt Lake County asked Moffat to dismiss a suit filed against the county by 
Associated Builders and Contractors of Utah Inc. and Concerned Taxpayers for 
Utah. The two groups challenged the county's right to require all contractors working 
on the Salt Palace to pay specific wages and benefits to subcontractors and 
employees. The county announced such plans in March, when it published bid 
requirements contractors must follow. 
Those bids must be turned in to the county by April 6. However, Moffat will not 
likely rule on whether the predetermined wage is legal until the afternoon of April 5. 
That not only gives contractors just 24 hours to modify bids they are preparing - if 
the ruling requires it - but also could affect the county's financing. County officials 
are traveling to New York City next week to arrange a $60 million bond package, 
and they fear the litigation could have an adverse effect on interest rates. 
If Moffat hasn't ruled by 4 p.m. on April 5, the independent contractors will be back 
in his courtroom asking for a temporary re-strain-ing order halting the bid until the 
judge has decided the issue, said Robert Babcock, attorney for the ABC. 
Moffat expressed skepticism during Monday's hearing about the county's reasons 
for requiring the higher wages. Hyde said the county wanted to ensure that workers 
on the project receive decent wages. "We use a standard of decency: fair wage for 
fair work." 
The words didn't impress Moffat. "I don't buy the decency thing much," he said. 
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The county also required the higher wages to guarantee that only qualified workers 
renovated the Salt Palace and to prevent strikes or walkouts. Well-paid workers are 
less likely to walk off the job, Hyde told the judge. 
Predetermined wages are a rather indirect way of controlling the quality of work, 
aren't they, Moffat asked. "You can say to the contractor, 'You will do the job. We 
will have inspectors on the site to see that you do,'" Moffat said. "Why should the 
county get involved in the relationship between the contractors and their employees?" 
Moffat also pointed out that well-paid workers have been known to walk off jobs as 
frequently as lower-paid workers. 
The court has no right to tell the county how to run its business, Hyde countered. 
"If the court gets involved in making the decisions on these things, we'll be out of 
business. We won't know which way to jump on these things." 
Hyde cited several state laws that essentially give the county power to do what it 
must do to run a safe and effective government. 
Those powers don't include fixing wages, Babcock told Moffat. State law requires 
governments to accept the lowest responsible bid on public works projects, he said. 
Requiring predetermined wages runs afoul of that policy. 
The Utah Legislature appropriated $15 million to the county for the Salt Palace 
renovation but added the caveat that the county must give the work to the low bidder. 
The county's plan to call for a predeterminated wage means that all bids will be high. 
If what the county is doing is illegal, why isn't the state part of the lawsuit, Moffat 
asked. "Because they are waiting to see what you do," Babcock responded. The 
governor's staff is aware of the suit and troubled by the county's actions, he said. 
Attorneys for both sides argued the matter for two hours, then told Moffat they 
wanted to submit written briefs on the matter. ABC lawyers filed a lengthy brief with 
the court Monday outlining reasons they believed Moffat should decide the suit in 
ABC's favor. 
County attorneys will file a reply to that brief on Thursday. ABC attorneys will file 
a reply to the county's brief Friday morning. 
Moffat was irritated with the lawyers for seeking the rest of the week to file briefs, 
then telling him he must rule by early next week. "I'll try to do my damnedest," he 
said. "But I think you are asking the impossible." 
Hyde urged Moffat not to postpone the bidding past April 6. The county has already 
booked several conventions in the Salt Palace, expecting it to be finished 610 days 
after renovation begins. Those conventions will bring as many as 40,000 people to 
Utah and millions of dollars into the state. In order to be done for those conventions, 
work must begin April 15, Hyde told the judge. 
"If they get an injunction (postponing the bids) they win the case," Hyde said. 
And if they don't, the county wins, the judge retorted, "so don't point fingers at 
them . . . I'll do what I can and maybe I'll have a decision by April 6." 
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